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Caught between Autocracy and Jihadism 
Syria’s Christians Hope for the Implementation of Geneva I 
Petra Becker 
The discourse conducted by Syria’s Christians since March 2011 reveals that many of 
them have now turned their back on the protest movement, despite their initial sym-
pathy and even involvement with it. These Christians have not turned away out of 
any deeply held convictions in support of the regime, but because they are worried by 
the militarisation and radicalisation of the revolution, and by the fact that after three 
years the opposition has still not shown itself to be a credible alternative to the regime. 
German and European policymakers should continue working towards a political solu-
tion and avoid supporting any particular religious or ethnic groups at the expense of 
others, because apart from those in areas where foreign Jihadists operate, Christians in 
Syria are no more at risk than other Syrians. 
 
Christians are firmly rooted in Syrian soci-
ety, and account for an estimated 8–10 
percent of the population. The three largest 
of their eleven denominations are the 
Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox 
and Greek Catholic communities. Apart 
from the Armenians, the Assyrians and the 
Chaldeans, Christians are among the oldest 
inhabitants of the modern state of Syria. 
Particularly in rural areas, people are very 
much aware of this rootedness. Many Mus-
lims in rural areas even know which of 
their ancestors converted from Christianity 
to Islam; the other side of their clan remains 
Christian but is still seen as extended family. 
This knowledge of common roots lives 
on to this day, and helps to explain why, 
during three years of conflict, Christians 
have so rarely been the target of religiously 
motivated violence. In various places, 
there have been reports of local Muslim 
populations coming to the defence of 
Christians when they were attacked by 
foreign Jihadists. 
Many Christians hope that the situation 
will stabilise, allowing them to resume 
their lives as before. The Armenians are less 
optimistic, their memories clouded by the 
genocide of their ancestors during World 
War I in what is now Turkey. The same is 
true of the Chaldeans and Assyrians, who 
fled to the Syrian Euphrates region after 
World War I in response to massacres of the 
Christian population in Iraq. 
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 Regional Differences 
Christian settlements are spread through-
out the whole of Syria but, like other seg-
ments of the population, Christians have 
fled their homes to escape the fighting. As a 
result, the original demographic spread has 
changed considerably, and the situation of 
Christians varies a great deal, depending 
on the forces in control of different parts 
of the country. 
The Kurdish North-East 
After the uprising began in 2011, the north-
east remained mostly calm because the 
regime had bought the allegiance of large 
parts of the Kurdish opposition. As soon 
as demonstrations broke out, major con-
cessions were made to the Kurds, who up 
to that point had been the most heavily 
marginalised ethnic minority. The regime 
allowed the Kurdish Democratic Union 
Party (PYD) – the Syrian branch of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which 
operates in Turkey – to take charge of the 
region’s security, and enforce law and order 
on its behalf. 
The historical experience of the Arme-
nians, Chaldeans and Assyrians was a key 
reason why the majority of them left the 
north-east long before the first Jihadist 
groups arrived there. Moreover, they were 
able to reunite with family members 
among large diaspora communities of 
Assyrians and Arameans, particularly in 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. 
Since 2013 Kurdish areas have been 
regularly threatened by Jihadist militias, 
especially the al-Qaeda affiliated group the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This 
has led many Christians in the region to 
move closer to the left-wing secular PYD, 
which, according to its manifesto, champi-
ons the rights of minorities. However, the 
PYD has itself brutally persecuted political 
enemies in the past, and so it seems doubt-
ful that it can be a guarantor of pluralism 
and democracy. 
Rebel-Controlled Areas 
The regime has lost control over the 
provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Raqqa und Deir 
ez-Zor, and most Christians have fled from 
them. The main reason for their flight was 
one that equally affected their Muslim 
neighbours: the threat of fighting and area 
bombardment, which the regime inflicts 
upon areas no longer under its control. 
Furthermore, in rebel-held areas practically 
all sources of income have dried up. Fear 
of Jihadists, by contrast, was a less pressing 
reason to flee. After regime-controlled media 
had initially fuelled this fear, despite a lack 
of any particular cause for concern, the 
threat did become more severe during the 
course of 2013. 
Christians are at particularly high risk 
anywhere ISIS is active, although practi-
cally all Christians have left such areas. In 
March 2014 it was reported from Raqqa 
province that ISIS was forcing the few 
remaining Christians there to pay the jizya, 
a capitation tax that was required of reli-
gious minorities under the Ottoman empire 
for example. In current reports of public 
executions, the victims are generally 
fighters from rival rebel groups or political 
activists who stand up to ISIS. 
According to statements by church 
representatives and human rights organisa-
tions, there have so far been very few reli-
giously motivated murders of Christians 
throughout the country. In Aleppo, Chris-
tian institutions and Christian activists are 
working in the rebel-held part of the city 
(though only in small numbers). This is also 
true (or was true) of rebel strongholds in 
disputed areas, such as the old town centre 
of Homs or the town of Yabroud in the Anti-
Lebanon mountains, where Christians 
organised a shared civil administration 
together with the Sunni majority without 
being subject to discrimination. When in 
mid-2013 Jihadists from outside the area 
shot at churches in Yabroud, the local coun-
cil posted sentries in front of the churches, 
thus preventing further hostilities. It was 
not until mid-March 2014, when the govern-
ment army and Hezbollah attempted to 
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 recapture the town, that most of the in-
habitants fled. They were fearful of regime 
forces, who in recapturing the neighbour-
ing town of Deir Atiyah had gone on a loot-
ing spree, shot civilians indiscriminately 
and burnt their bodies later. 
Disputed Areas 
In the west-central Syrian provinces of 
Hama and Homs, fighting has continued to 
flare up between regime forces and rebels. 
This, along with the desperate security 
situation in general, has caused approxi-
mately half of the Christians to leave their 
villages. Large parts of the city of Homs 
have been destroyed by army bombard-
ment. Residents report that there are no 
longer any neighbourhoods in which 
Sunnis and Alawites live together. Never-
theless, Christians in Homs still live in 
mixed neighbourhoods (some with Alawites 
and some with Sunnis), without any major 
conflicts arising. 
In Deraa province the frontlines are 
shifting constantly between the regime 
forces, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and 
Jihadists, who entered the country from 
Jordan to form Jabhat an-Nusra. Conse-
quently, most Christians have also fled 
from the province. Christians in the south-
west area around Damascus and the Golan 
Heights, on the other hand, have mostly 
remained in their villages, having appar-
ently come to an arrangement with both 
regime forces and local FSA units. 
Regime-controlled Areas 
Christians have also migrated from areas 
under regime control, such as Damascus 
and the coastal mountain range. However, 
the proportion of Christians among the 
population as a whole here has increased, 
as Christians from other regions have 
sought refuge in these areas. This applies to 
the city centre of Damascus, but especially 
to the coastal mountain range. A special 
case is Wadi an-Nasara (Valley of the Chris-
tians) between Homs and Tartous, which is 
the only region in Syria where Christians 
make up the majority of the population. 
According to estimates, the number of its 
residents has quadrupled since 2011 due to 
the immigration of Christians, mostly from 
Homs but also from Damascus and Aleppo. 
Reasons for Fleeing and 
Places of Refuge 
Apart from the fighting, bombardment and 
poverty, another major reason for fleeing is 
widespread crime. Neither the regime forces 
nor the rebels are paid well enough to sup-
port their families, and so they exploit the 
population by extorting money from them 
at checkpoints or taking passers-by hostage. 
Both sides feel encouraged to engage in this 
behaviour, as they are confident that they 
will not be called to account for it. Further-
more, common criminals often pose as 
militia members of one side or the other, 
and commit crimes in their name. The 
regime contributed to this situation in the 
first year of the revolution by enacting 
amnesties that allowed common criminals 
to be released. Residents of all parts of the 
country complain that the regime recruited 
many of these small-time criminals, who 
were already known to the police, into their 
militias. These so-called “Popular Commit-
tees” are supposed to provide security in 
their local neighbourhoods, but in fact 
often do the opposite. 
The uncertain political situation is an-
other factor which could drive the Chris-
tians out of the country permanently. If 
made to choose sides, Christians would 
tend to side with the Assad regime rather 
than the opposition; yet in conversation 
most of them readily admit that they see no 
future for Syria under Assad either. Among 
the refugees who have left Syria since the 
outbreak of unrest in March 2011, the pro-
portion of Christians is relatively low. Most 
of the refugees in the camps in neighbour-
ing countries are Sunnis. Some of the 
Armenians have fled to Armenia, but most 
Christians seek sanctuary in the coastal 
mountain range or go to Lebanon, where 
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 many hope to receive the support of family 
and church networks. Above all it seems 
that the Christians who leave the country 
are those who can afford it or can emigrate 
to the West. Those who do not have this 
option flee from one town or region to the 
next, depending on where the situation 
is least dangerous, or are forced to return 
home if they run out of money. 
The Syrian Regime – 
Protector of Christians? 
The Assad regime presents itself as a pro-
tecting power of the Christians. However, 
on a publicity visit to the famous Christian 
pilgrimage site at Maaloula in April 2014, 
Assad made no mention of the fact that 
most of the damage to churches and mon-
asteries there had been caused by the 
Syrian army and that the town, which 
had changed hands in the fighting several 
times, had been looted by rebels and 
regime forces alike. 
Assad’s strategy is to polarise religious 
minorities and the Sunni majority popu-
lation. He has aimed from the very begin-
ning to drive a wedge between the Sunnis 
on the one hand and the Alawites, Chris-
tians, Druze, Ismaili and Shiites on the 
other. His regime drove the protest move-
ment to militarisation through heavy use 
of violence, and fuelled its radicalisation 
by releasing dozens of Jihadists from high 
security prisons. Largely through intimida-
tion, disinformation and fomenting con-
flicts between the various groups, he has 
managed to prevent the Christians from 
broader commitment to the revolution. 
Intimidation 
From the outset, anyone involved with the 
revolution ran the risk of being shot or 
imprisoned, but the security services dealt 
with Christians more carefully. They were 
still arrested at demonstrations or sub-
jected to interrogations, but on the whole 
they were quickly released again. During 
interrogations they were accused of un-
wittingly supporting foreign-controlled 
terrorists. However, there was no guaran-
tee of safety for Christians. To name just 
two high-profile examples: the well-known 
Christian human rights lawyer, Khalil 
Maatouk, was taken away by the intelli-
gence service in autumn 2012; to this day 
he remains imprisoned and has yet to be 
brought before a custodial judge; the Chris-
tian sculptor, Wael Qastoun, was tortured 
to death by members of the intelligence 
service in July 2012. 
Targeted Disinformation 
One of the most effective weapons of the 
regime is its consistent strategy of disin-
formation, which is not only aimed at the 
home front, but also at the outside world. 
To implement this strategy it uses the 
regime-controlled media and the intelli-
gence services. From the outset, the regime-
controlled media portrayed the protests as 
an uprising initiated by foreign Salafists 
willing to use violence to establish a theoc-
racy in Syria. Meanwhile, the intelligence 
service was tasked to spray anti-Christian 
slogans on the walls of Christian neighbour-
hoods, or to send agents provocateurs to mix 
with the demonstrators, shouting such 
slogans in order to discredit the protest 
movement and frighten the Christians. 
Another frequently observed strategy is to 
position artillery in the immediate vicinity 
of monasteries and churches, and to fire at 
Sunni villages from there. 
In pursuing its media strategy, the 
regime can also rely upon the churches 
that they have brought into line. In early 
2011 a group of Christian activists visited 
the spiritual leaders of the Christian denomi-
nations to ask them to exercise restraint in 
their pro-regime rhetoric. Subsequently one 
of the patriarchs betrayed them to the intel-
ligence service. The Greek Catholic church 
was put under such pressure that it even 
cancelled its funeral service for the young 
oppositional filmmaker, Bassel Shehadeh, 
who died in the army’s bombardment of 
Homs in May 2012. 
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 Clerics of various denominations allow 
themselves to be used by the regime. They 
help to spread media lies about massacres 
of Christians in order to provide publicity 
abroad for the Assad regime, which is seek-
ing to sell itself as the only guarantor of 
the survival of Christianity in Syria. Recalci-
trant priests, on the other hand, can expect 
reprisals: the Italian Jesuit Paolo dell’Oglio, 
who worked for thirty years to improve 
understanding between Christians and 
Muslims in Syria, was declared persona non 
grata by the regime at the end of 2011. 
Priests who do not clearly side with the 
regime are intimidated. 
Fomenting religious conflicts 
The regime tries at all costs to prevent 
Christians from showing solidarity with 
Sunnis, the main victims of regime violence. 
The actions of the security services in the 
small west-central Syrian town of al-Suqay-
labiyah on Good Friday 2011 serve as an 
example of this. In the Sunni villages in the 
surrounding areas of al-Suqaylabiyah they 
spread the false message that at midday a 
large anti-regime demonstration would be 
held in the town, whereupon the villagers 
made their way by bus to the supposed 
demonstration. Meanwhile security forces 
in al-Suqaylabiyah, where the annual Good 
Friday procession was taking place, started 
a rumour that the Sunnis from the neigh-
bouring villages were on their way into 
town to set fire to the church. It was only 
thanks to the level-headedness of the town’s 
dignitaries, who had seen through the deceit-
ful plan, that bloodshed was avoided. 
Syria – a Secular State? 
Practices of the kind outlined above have 
nothing in common with the protection 
of religious minorities. Even from a purely 
legal point of view, the regime’s claim to 
be the sole guarantor of a secular state and 
of coexistence of all denominations and 
religions in harmony and equality, does not 
stand up to scrutiny. 
Religious freedom is guaranteed in both 
the 1970 constitution, which came into 
force under the Ba’ath regime, and the 
constitution rushed through by Assad in 
2012. However, both stipulate that the 
president must be a Muslim and that Islam 
is the main source of legislation. 
The principle of equality before the law 
has always been in place. An exception to 
this, as in nearly all Middle Eastern coun-
tries, is civil status law. This legal area is 
dealt with by Sharia courts for Muslims, 
and by church courts for Christians. How-
ever, Christians have been increasingly 
critical of this in recent decades as it means, 
for instance, that it is impossible for mem-
bers of the various Catholic churches to get 
divorced according to civil law. 
Moreover, religious freedom only applies 
to Christians who are born as such. Syrian 
law does not allow for conversion to Chris-
tianity, although it certainly allows con-
version to Islam, and this can potentially 
lead to conflict in interfaith marriages. If a 
Muslim woman wishes to marry a Christian 
man, the latter is obliged to convert to Islam. 
A Christian woman, on the other hand, 
may marry a Muslim without renouncing 
her faith. However, she may not inherit his 
possessions, because neither Christians nor 
Muslims can inherit from one other. 
Christians also criticise the Assad regime 
for the fact that after the suppression of 
the 1982 uprising (in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood was the key player), it co-opted 
conservative Sunni clerics in a calculated 
power play. Never before in Syria have so 
many mosques been built as during the 
Assad era. The government established 
large numbers of Quran schools (the so-
called Hafez al-Assad schools for memoris-
ing the Quran), and in 2005 the Ba’ath 
regime was so keen to find favour with the 
conservative Islamic clergy that it banned 
a book which questioned the veiling of 
women. 
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 Political Representation under the 
Ba’ath Regime 
If one talks to older Syrian Christians they 
complain that the influence of Christians 
has decreased under forty years of Ba’athist 
rule. In the first half of the 20th century 
Christians had an active role in politics. 
For instance, two major Syrian parties were 
established by Christians: the Arabic Social-
ist Ba’ath Party, by Michel Aflaq, and the 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), by 
Antoun Saadeh, although neither of these 
parties had a democratic, pluralistic agenda. 
Under the Ba’ath regime, independent 
political activity was no longer possible. It 
pursued co-optation rather than participa-
tion. In the 1970s, left-wing parties and 
unions were involved in the uprising along 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. Subsequent-
ly, parties that did not allow themselves to 
be co-opted were banned, as were all inde-
pendent youth organisations. Youth employ-
ment was then only possible through the 
Ba’ath Party’s “Revolutionary Youth Union”. 
Only in 2000 were churches re-permitted 
to set up scout groups, which until then 
had also fallen under the ban. Their activ-
ities were subject to heavy surveillance, 
however, as were the sermons in mosques 
and churches. Even today, no ecclesiastical 
office is awarded without the approval of 
the intelligence service; their approval is 
required for all church activities, and for 
all other civil society activities. 
High-Profile Christians 
in the Opposition 
In 2001, encouraged by promises of reform 
made by Bashar al-Assad upon taking office, 
a civil rights movement was formed known 
as the “Damascus Spring”, although this 
was soon cracked down on by Assad him-
self. Christians were well represented among 
the movement’s main protagonists, with 
journalists and authors such as Michel Kilo, 
Akram al-Bunni, Hussein Awdat and An-
toun Maqdisi, and the historian Abdallah 
Hanna. High-profile lawyers in the Syrian 
human rights movement included Anwar 
al-Bunni, Khalil Maatouq, Michal Shammas, 
Daad Moussa and Catherine at-Telli. 
The same Christians were involved when 
the opposition made another attempt to 
form, with the Damascus Declaration in 
2005. They were involved again in March 
2011, when the first protests were organ-
ised in Damascus to demand an end to the 
state of emergency in place since 1963, 
along with serious political reforms. Chris-
tians also took part in spontaneous protests 
in rural areas. Christian activists from all 
parts of the country tell of their partici-
pation in secret meetings to discuss the 
demands of the revolutionary movement. 
According to them, it was unanimously 
agreed at these meetings that the uprising 
was not aimed against any particular 
segment of society, but rather against an 
unjust regime which suppressed all activity 
within civil society. 
The role of Christians in the revolution-
ary movement, then, is by no means as small 
as one might suppose. Apart from Christian 
politicians and civil activists there are even 
Christian fighters among the rebels. Despite 
this, however, the majority of the Christian 
population has distanced itself from the 
revolutionary movement. This is as much 
due to the militarisation and radicalisa-
tion of the movement as to the successful 
counter-strategies of the Syrian regime. 
Both of these factors have led to the majority 
of Christians fearing the fall of the regime, 
although they are aware that the regime 
actively fuels religious tensions. 
Weakness of the Opposition 
Although, when asked, most Christians are 
certain that the Assad regime can neither 
bring peace to Syria in the long term nor 
improve their security, they rightly point 
out that the opposition has so far not 
managed to provide a credible alternative 
to the regime that can guarantee the secu-
rity and rights of all citizens. Many Chris-
tians distrust the National Coalition of the 
opposition, which in their eyes is an Islamist 
project. High-profile Christian opposition 
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 members of the National Coalition, such as 
Michel Kilo or George Sabra are dismissed 
by many as “token Christians” who are being 
used to give the coalition a secular veneer. 
This view is reinforced by the military 
balance of power in rebel-controlled areas. 
Financial backing of Islamist and Salafist 
groups by state and private actors from the 
Gulf States has led to such groups control-
ling most of the rebel-held areas. Attacks on 
churches and – in a few isolated cases – 
on Christians, mostly carried out by foreign 
Jihadists, have also earned the opposition a 
bad reputation as far as Christians are con-
cerned. 
Representation vs. Civil Rights 
Christians who want to become politically 
active in the public domain find them-
selves in a predicament. Almost all Chris-
tian oppositional politicians and activists 
openly wish to avoid making an issue of 
their religious beliefs, because they would 
see this as a betrayal of a fundamental 
demand of the revolution, namely the 
equality of all citizens with regard to their 
rights and obligations. Various Christian 
groups have become established within the 
opposition who explicitly want to be active 
as Christians, and occasionally make public 
statements protesting against being co-opted 
by the regime. However, attempts to unify 
these groups to achieve a broader represen-
tation of Christians within the opposition 
have so far failed for fear of slipping into a 
proportional system, as this kind of system, 
in which certain offices and quotas are 
reserved for various religious communities, 
has not led to a functioning state either in 
Lebanon or Iraq. 
Christians Take up Arms 
The insecurity currently felt by Christians 
in Syria has led to their taking up arms 
in certain areas. Initially this was for the 
defence of their residential areas. 
However, continued attempts by the 
intelligence services to involve the Chris-
tians in armed clashes with their Sunni 
neighbours have been partially successful. 
Elements of the “National Defence Force”, 
a militia formed by the regime from local 
and SSNP militias, have been incited to 
attack Sunni villages. The most recent 
notable instance of these dangerous devel-
opments was the looting of the village of 
al-Husn in Wadi an-Nasara in late March 
2014, and the displacement of its Sunni 
population. 
In the Kurdish north-east there are a 
small number of Assyrian Christians who 
have formed their own unit within the 
Kurdish “People’s Protection Units” (YPG), 
the military wing of the PYD. Until now this 
form of militarisation and use of force has 
been viewed with unease by the Christian 
population. However, if the conflict becomes 
increasingly polarised along religious lines, 
it can be assumed that the Christians will 
ultimately become heavily involved in 
the fighting, as they did in the Lebanese 
civil war. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
At the present time, Christians are in 
danger not primarily because of their faith 
but because, like all Syrians, they are ex-
posed to fighting, bombardments and the 
desperate security situation. However, if 
the conflict cannot be resolved in the fore-
seeable future they will be at considerable 
risk due to increasing radicalisation and 
polarisation along religious lines. On the 
one hand there is the risk of attacks and 
suppression from Jihadists, and on the 
other hand there is the risk of growing 
radicalisation and militarisation within 
their own ranks. This is bound to lead to 
confrontation with the majority popula-
tion, with whom they have coexisted peace-
fully until now. 
It would therefore be counterproductive 
to emphasise the risk to Christians in this 
conflict, let alone to allow special quotas 
of Christians when admitting refugees into 
the country; this would create the impres-
sion that Christians were the protégés of 
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 the West, which would put them under 
even more pressure at home. 
Instead, Germany and Europe should do 
all they can to find a permanent settlement 
to the conflict. However, this will only 
succeed if all groups in the country can be 
confident that in a future Syria the prin-
ciples of Geneva will apply: commitment 
to a democratic multi-party system which 
respects the rights of all citizens, regard-
less of their ethnic or religious identity. 
This was also the conclusion reached by 
the attendees of a conference which the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung helped to organise 
in March 2014 in Amman (see “Present and 
Future of Christians in Syria”, http://www. 
alqudscenter.org/english/pages.php?local_ 
type=122&local_details=1&idd=342). 
The resignation of United Nations and 
Arab League Special Envoy, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, should not be a reason to give up 
hope of a negotiated settlement. Russia and 
Iran need to be included in this in order to 
put pressure on the regime and persuade 
it to allow a ceasefire and a transitional 
government. At the same time Saudi Arabia 
and the other Gulf States must be urged to 
stop financing Jihadist groups and to pro-
hibit private actors from doing so. 
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